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Note
Insufficient Government Protection: The
Inescapable Element in Domestic Violence
Asylum Cases
Elsa M. Bullard∗
After years of abuse including beatings, the burning of her
bed while she slept, and rape at gunpoint, a Mexican woman
identified as L.R. sought refuge in the United States.1 L.R. requested assistance from police in her small Mexican village on
several occasions, but due to her common-law husband’s clout
in the community, her attempts for protection failed.2 She suffered abuse until her tormentor left with the couple’s three
small children.3 L.R. eventually won custody and a protection
order through the Mexican court system, and in the midst of
continued threats to her and her family, L.R. departed with her
children to the United States.4
In April 2009 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
indicated that the Obama Administration may be open to altering or defining the United States’ policy for victims of domestic
violence applying for asylum.5 In a supplemental brief opposing
asylum to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in L.R’s
case, the DHS suggested two acceptable formulations of a key
∗ J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 2000,
United States Military Academy. Special thanks to Professors Steve Meili and
Emily Good for invaluable counsel and advice on topic development and editing. I extend my appreciation to the Editors and Staff of the Minnesota Law
Review, especially Joe Hansen for his insightful comments. Lastly, I thank my
husband, Mike, for his patience and support throughout law school. Copyright
© 2011 by Elsa M. Bullard.
1. Amended Declaration of L.R. in Support of Application for Asylum at 7–
9, L.R. v. United States (B.I.A. Dec. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Declaration of L.R.],
available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/20090716-asylum
-support.pdf.
2. Id. at 9.
3. Id. at 13.
4. Id. at 18.
5. See Julia Preston, New Policy Permits Asylum for Battered Women,
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 13548496.
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asylum eligibility element, persecution on account of a “particular social group,” and recommended remand of the case, but did
not discuss the government’s inability to protect the victim in
detail.6 The severity of L.R.’s abuse and the large amount of
supporting country-condition information proving the prevalence of domestic abuse in rural Mexico led the DHS attorney to
stipulate to asylum in L.R.’s case.7 In August 2010 an immigration judge granted L.R. asylum in a short unpublished opinion.8
Even with a clear definition of an acceptable “social group,”
demonstrating that the Mexican government is unable or unwilling to protect a domestic violence victim poses another significant hurdle to meeting the requirements for asylum eligibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).9 In the future, the pivotal
element for domestic violence asylum applicants may be demonstrating that their home country governments are unable or
unwilling to protect them from their persecutors.10
The definition of “refugee” lays out the elements for asylum
eligibility.11 These elements require that an applicant be “unable or unwilling to return to . . . [or] avail himself or herself of
the protection of” his or her native country due to “persecution
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.”12 Membership in a “particular social group”
offers the only applicable category for a domestic violence situation.13 In its supplemental brief for L.R.’s case, DHS lawyers
6. Supplemental Brief of the Department of Homeland Security at 14,
L.R. v. United States (B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Supplemental Brief in
L.R.], available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/20090716
-asylum-brief.pdf (recommending the particular social group be defined as either “Mexican women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” or
“Mexican women who are viewed as property by virtue of their position within
a domestic relationship”).
7. See Julia Preston, Asylum Granted to Mexican Woman in Case Setting
Standard on Domestic Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, at A14, available at
2010 WLNR 16141188.
8. Matter of L.R., CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., http://cgrs
.uchastings.edu/campaigns/Matter%20of%20LR.php (last visited Apr. 8, 2011).
9. See Supplemental Brief in L.R., supra note 6, at 27 (noting the requisite factor of proving that “Mexican authorities were unwilling or unable to
protect” the asylum seeker).
10. See id. at 21–22.
11. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
12. Id.
13. See Laura S. Adams, Beyond Gender: State Failure to Protect Domestic
Violence Victims as a Basis for Granting Refugee Status, 24 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 239, 242 (2002).
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recognized that the “unable or unwilling” government element
may be the most difficult element to prove for future domestic
violence victims seeking asylum.14 They neglected, however, to
suggest a test or threshold requirement for this element, instead leaving it to the review and discretion of the asylum officers.15
After years of focus on defining a particular social group for
domestic violence asylum applicants, DHS statements in In re
L.R. and In re R-A- remove the issue from the center of these
asylum claims.16 That does not mean applications based on
domestic violence will sail through the immigration system.
The examples of the United Kingdom and Canadian courts indicate that decisionmakers’ focus will shift to the ability and
willingness of governments to protect domestic violence victims.17 Examining decisions in the United Kingdom and Canada is instructive as both countries, like the United States, adhere to the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees.18 The United Kingdom and Canada expanded the
definition of particular social group to include gender-based
applicants several years ago.19 The examples of the United
14. Supplemental Brief in L.R., supra note 6, at 21–22.
15. See id.
16. See Department of Homeland Security Response to the Respondent’s
Supplemental Filing of August 18, 2009, Alvarado-Pena (Exec. Office for Immigration Review Oct. 28, 2009) (No. A073 753 922) [hereinafter DHS Response in Alvarado-Pena], available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/
pdf/national/20091030asylum_brief.pdf (granting asylum as a matter of discretion); Supplemental Brief in L.R., supra note 6, at 14; see also Preston, supra note 7, at A14 (discussing the final outcome in In re L.R.).
17. See infra notes 96–107 and accompanying text (discussing an altered
focus in cases in the United Kingdom and Canada after the acceptance of domestic violence victims as an eligible social group).
18. The United Nations Convention defines a refugee as a person with a
“well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion . . . [who is] unable
or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail [themselves] of the protection of
each of those [countries of nationality or habitual residence].” See Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 150; see
also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006) (adopting a nearly identical definition as
that of the United Nations Convention); Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (Can.) (defining a refugee as a person with a “wellfounded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion . . . who [are] unable or, by
reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of
those [countries of nationality or habitual residence]”).
19. See Ward v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, para. 78 (Can.) (finding asylum possible for “individuals fearing persecution on such bases as gender”); Ex
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Kingdom and Canada indicate a shift in focus to the availability of state protection for domestic violence victims and away
from the definition of particular social group.20 An unwilling
and unable government is likely to become an ever-more important element for asylum applicants to argue in future applications for asylum in the United States as well.21
Although discretion is important in asylum to ensure consideration of the facts of each individual applicant’s situation,
asylum officers should apply discretion within a regulatory
framework in order to provide some consistency between cases.22 This Note examines thresholds set in the past to establish
a government’s inability or unwillingness to protect its citizens,
and continues by suggesting factors the Obama Administration
should incorporate into any new asylum policies regarding domestic violence applicants. Part I explains the development and
current state of asylum law as it relates to victims of domestic
violence, focusing on the governmental protection element. Part
II examines case law interpretations indicating the central importance of the governmental protection element, describes
challenges facing domestic violence asylum applicants, and
analyzes various approaches to the element of government protection. In Part III, this Note suggests a standard and accompanying factors for determining whether an applicant’s country
is unable or unwilling to protect the applicant from domestic
violence. This Note argues that in addition to defining acceptable social groups, DHS should outline the threshold requirements to prove an applicant’s home country government is unable or unwilling to protect the applicant from an abuser.
I. GENDER-BASED ASYLUM CLAIMS: HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF ASYLUM LAW
In order to appreciate the challenges domestic violence victims face seeking asylum in the United States, scholars, practitioners, and advocates must understand the overall legal
framework of asylum. This Part first explains asylum law in
parte Shah, [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (H.L.) [647] (appeal taken from Immigration
Appeal Tribunal) (Eng.).
20. See infra notes 96–107 and accompanying text.
21. See Supplemental Brief in L.R., supra note 6, at 21–22.
22. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum
Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 296 (2007) (offering statistical data on asylum officer decisions over more than a four-year time period to demonstrate
and denounce the inconsistency in the officers’ discretionary grants of asylum).
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the United States, then discusses the history of gender-based
asylum law, and finally examines the development of asylum
law in the area of domestic violence.
A. AN OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
For successful applicants, asylum provides protection within the United States, an opportunity for employment,23 and the
chance to bring family members to the United States.24 This
section focuses on the statutory requirements,25 which many
applicants struggle to overcome in order to receive a discretionary grant of asylum.26
The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees forms the basis for U.S. asylum law.27 To receive asylum, an applicant must meet the definition of refugee28 and must not be barred for any other statutory reason.29
The burden of proof lies solely with the applicant to demonstrate that these statutory requirements are met.30 A refugee is
defined as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .31

In order to satisfy the definition, an applicant must demonstrate that her well-founded fear of persecution, from which
her government is unwilling or unable to provide protection, is
“on account of” her membership in one of the five protected categories.32
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(B).
24. Id. § 1158(b)(3)(A).
25. Id. § 1158(b)(1).
26. See, e.g., Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358–68 (B.I.A. 1996)
(finding credibility easily, but engaging in an in-depth analysis as to the eligibility requirements).
27. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 18,
at 150.
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A).
29. See id. § 1158 (b)(2)(A) (listing examples of other statutory bars including filing outside of the one-year deadline, aggravated felony convictions,
being firmly resettled in another country, and persecuting others based on a
protected ground).
30. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
31. Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
32. Id.
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The applicant’s well-founded fear of persecution can be
based on either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution.33 A finding of past persecution creates a presumption of future persecution.34 The government can rebut
this presumption by showing either a change in conditions such
that a well-founded fear is no longer reasonable or demonstrate
that reasonable relocation within the country of origin ends a
fear of persecution.35 A change in conditions includes changes
in either the applicant’s situation or the country’s conditions.36
For example, a woman who filed an asylum application under
the protected grounds of religion, but who has since converted
to a different sect accepted within her country of origin, would
no longer qualify for the presumption based on past persecution.37 The reasonableness of relocation depends on consideration of several factors offered in the regulation.38
A well-founded fear of future persecution must be both objectively and subjectively reasonable.39 If a reasonable person
in the applicant’s situation would fear persecution if made to
return to the applicant’s country of origin, a court would find
that that fear is objectively reasonable.40 The applicant’s fear
must be subjectively reasonable as demonstrated by her credible testimony.41 When the persecutor is an individual or group
separate from the government, the applicant has to demon33. Establishing Asylum Eligibility, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (2010).
34. Id. § 208.13(b)(1).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Case law regarding changed conditions varies somewhat among circuit courts. Compare Hoxhallari v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 179, 187 (2d Cir. 2006)
(holding that when changed circumstances “evidently prevail” in a country, an
immigration judge need not make specific findings of these changes in the
record), and Menendez-Donis v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2004)
(basing a finding of changed country conditions on State Department and human rights reports), with Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th
Cir. 2002) (stating that when past persecution has been established, a State
Department report alone is not sufficient to demonstrate changed country
conditions). This Note merely provides a general description of law in this area.
38. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3). In determining the reasonableness of relocation an adjudicator should consider “whether the applicant would face other serious harm in the place of suggested relocation; any ongoing civil strife
within the country; administrative, economic, or judicial infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social and cultural constraints, such as age, gender,
health, and social and familial ties.” Id.
39. See, e.g., Hassan v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 661, 666 (8th Cir. 2004).
40. See, e.g., Miranda v. INS, 139 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1998).
41. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987).
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strate that she is unable or unwilling to avail herself of her
government’s protection.42
In order to demonstrate that persecution is “on account of”
one of the protected grounds, the applicant must first establish
membership in one of the protected classes.43 Of the five protected classes—race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, and political opinion—the particular
social group is the most controversial and the grounds under
which many domestic violence victims file for asylum.44 People
who share an immutable characteristic, or some characteristic
so fundamental that a person should not be asked to alter it,
form a particular social group.45 The group cannot be defined,
however, by the persecution itself.46 Once the applicant establishes that one of the protected classes applies to her, she must
demonstrate that her persecution was “on account of” the protected ground.47 An applicant must satisfy all elements in the
definition of “refugee” in order to be eligible for asylum.48 The
next section discusses specific interpretations of this statutory
language as it relates to gender.
B. THE HISTORY OF GENDER-BASED ASYLUM CLAIMS
Women seeking asylum based on a gender-related49 issue
face significant obstacles. First, gender violence is often not
42. See Adams, supra note 13, at 242 (outlining the current state of asylum law in regard to nongovernmental persecutors).
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
44. See Deborah Anker et al., Women Whose Governments Are Unable or
Unwilling to Provide Reasonable Protection from Domestic Violence May Qualify as Refugees Under United States Asylum Law, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 709,
742 (1997) (explaining the difficulty of separating the social-group definition
from the political-opinion definition for victims of domestic violence).
45. See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993); Acosta, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 211, 212 (B.I.A. 1985) (defining an “immutable characteristic” as one that
is “beyond the power of the individual members of the group to change or is so
fundamental to their identities or consciences that it ought not be required to
be changed”).
46. See Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[A] social
group may not be circularly defined by the fact that it suffers persecution.”).
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
48. Id.
49. See Karen Musalo & Stephen Knight, Asylum for Victims of Gender
Violence: An Overview of the Law, and an Analysis of 45 Unpublished Decisions, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Dec. 2003, at 1, 1 (defining “gender asylum” as
when “(1) the feared harm is gender-specific or disproportionately impacts
women, and/or (2) the reason (i.e., nexus) the harm is imposed is related to, or
‘on account of ’ gender”).
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viewed as persecution when the applicant’s society accepts or
requires the behavior (as in the case of female genital mutilation (FGM)).50 Second, violence against women is often committed by private actors and not the government.51 Third, gender
is not one of the five protected grounds in the definition of refugee.52 Gender-specific human rights cases frequently involve
rape, FGM,53 or domestic violence.54 This section looks at the
chronological development of international and U.S. asylum
law on gender-based claims.
International humanitarian law first addressed violence
against women as a human rights issue in the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which was intended to further the human rights of women
around the globe.55 The early 1990s brought the promulgation
of various sets of guidelines regarding women’s gender-based
asylum claims. In 1991, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) issued guidelines stating that gender
may serve as grounds for asylum.56 Canada57 and the United
States led with similar guidelines in 1993 and 1995, respective-

50. See Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims: A Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L.
REV. 777, 781–82 (2003).
51. See id. at 782.
52. See id.
53. Female genital mutilation is a cultural practice of removing all or a
portion of a woman’s external genitalia, usually with rudimentary instruments and without anesthesia. Female Genital Mutilation, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (Feb. 2010), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/. The procedure is classified into four types ranging from merely pricking the genitals to
complete removal and narrowing of the vaginal opening. Id. FGM is performed
throughout the world, but predominantly in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East,
usually between infancy and age fifteen. Id.
54. See Musalo, supra note 50, at 782.
55. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; see also Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104
(Feb. 23, 1994) (strengthening protections for women).
56. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on the Protection of
Refugee Women, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/67 (July 22, 1991).
57. IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BD. OF CAN., WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIMANTS
FEARING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION: GUIDELINES ISSUED BY THE
CHAIRPERSON PURSUANT TO SECTION 65(3) OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT (1996)
[hereinafter CANADIAN GUIDELINES], available at http://www.irb.gc.ca/eng/
brdcom/references/pol/guidir/Pages/women.aspx.
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ly.58 Several other countries followed, including the United
Kingdom in 2000.59 The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Guidelines, promulgated in the United States, do not
dictate the decisions of immigration judges or asylum officers,
but they form part of the asylum officers’ required reading.60
These guidelines created optimism that women seeking asylum
on gender-based claims could look ahead to increased success.61
In practice, however, the jurisprudence following the guidelines
indicated that many obstacles continued to exist for genderbased asylum applicants.62
Early gender-based cases relied on various aspects of asylum law. Mostly unsuccessfully, applicants pled that their governments could not protect them, or they pled persecution on
account of religion or political opinion.63 In an early deportation-withholding case involving a gender-based claim, In re
Pierre, the Haitian applicant experienced violence at the hands
of her husband who served in a position equivalent to a senator
in the United States.64 She failed to plead membership in one of
the five protected groups and instead relied on her husband’s
high position, arguing it foreclosed any protection for her from
the Haitian government.65 The court dismissed the case based
on her failure to demonstrate how her persecution at the hands
of her husband was “on account of” one of the protected
grounds, and because she failed to present evidence showing
that the government could or would not protect her, stating
“[n]ot every unlawful act of individual harassment will amount
to persecution.”66 The court recognized that persecution could
58. Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Office of Internal Affairs, to all INS
Asylum Office/rs (May 26, 1995), available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/
documents/legal/guidelines_us.pdf.
59. IMMIGRATION APPELLATE AUTH., ASYLUM GENDER GUIDELINES (2000)
[hereinafter U.K. GUIDELINES], available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/
documents/legal/gender_guidelines/UK_guidelines.pdf.
60. See Patricia A. Seith, Note, Escaping Domestic Violence: Asylum as a
Means of Protection for Battered Women, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1804, 1830 (1997).
61. See Deborah E. Anker, Women Refugees: Forgotten No Longer?, 32
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 771, 778 (1995) (describing the INS guidelines as opening
“the possibility of a new era for women refugees”).
62. See Mark von Sternberg, Outline of United States Asylum Law: Substantive Criteria and Procedural Concerns, in DEFENDING IMMIGRATION
REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 2009, at 39, 68 (PLI N.Y. Practice Skills, Course Handbook Ser. No. 21,451, 2009).
63. See Anker et al., supra note 44, at 741–44.
64. Pierre, 15 I. & N. Dec. 461, 461–62 (B.I.A. 1975).
65. Id. at 462.
66. Id. at 463.
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occur at the hands of a nongovernmental actor for the purposes
of asylum, but set a high evidentiary threshold.67 This case set
the stage for the focus in later gender-based asylum cases on
defining a particular social group.
In re Fauziya Kasinga, decided in 1996, was the first case
that resulted in a woman gaining asylum based on a genderdefined social group.68 In Kasinga, the seventeen-year-old applicant feared that she would be forced to undergo FGM in her
native Togo.69 The court found persecution on account of her
membership in the particular social group defined as “young
women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had
FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice.”70 Since Kasinga, courts have found broader gender-based
particular social groups acceptable such as “Somali females.”71
Most gender-based asylum cases focus on defining the particular social group and demonstrating that the persecution is on
account of that group.72 Generally, in FGM cases, courts have
found government protection unavailable where there are no
laws prohibiting the practice, where FGM is viewed as engrained in the culture, and where the practice is prevalent
within the applicant’s country.73
The development of gender-based asylum law focused on
the definition of a particular social group. As the next section
discusses, the acceptance of gender as a way to define a particular social group in FGM cases, however, did not immediate-

67. See id. at 462 (citations omitted).
68. Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 368 (B.I.A. 1996).
69. Id. at 358.
70. Id. at 365.
71. See, e.g., Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 515, 518 (8th Cir. 2007)
(finding that in Somalia, where ninety-eight percent of the female population
undergoes FGM, a well-founded fear of persecution is reasonable for any Somali woman).
72. See Allison W. Reimann, Comment, Hope for the Future? The Asylum
Claims of Women Fleeing Sexual Violence in Guatemala, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1199, 1250–61 (2009) (focusing on the need for regulation, but only discussing
that need in reference to the particular social group and nexus requirements).
But see Adams, supra note 13, at 240 (arguing that commentators have spent
too much time focusing on gender groups and not enough on the state’s action
or lack of action).
73. See, e.g., Hassan, 484 F.3d at 515, 518 (using State Department reports to establish the prevalence of FGM at ninety-eight percent of women);
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 362 (relying on reports from the State Department
establishing the widespread practice of FGM in Togo and the general acceptance of the procedure).
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ly extend to women whose claims were based on domestic violence.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF ASYLUM LAW FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
VICTIMS IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND THE UNITED
KINGDOM
There is no binding U.S. precedent granting asylum to a
domestic violence claimant.74 Recent decisions, however, offer
greater hope to domestic violence applicants.75 Moreover, individual asylum officers and immigration judges have permitted
asylum under domestic violence conditions in some cases.76
Canada and the United Kingdom have more clearly defined
case law on domestic violence asylum than the United States.77
The United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees governs the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, thereby making a comparison of foreign case law relevant
to U.S. asylum law.78 Thus, this section will discuss U.S. as
well as Canadian and British case law developments in the
area of domestic violence asylum law.
The United States defines domestic violence as a violent
crime where the victim is the “spouse, former spouse, intimate
partner, former intimate partner, child, or former child . . . or
any other relative” of the perpetrator.79 This Note focuses only
on female domestic violence victims whose persecutor is a male
74. See von Sternberg, supra note 62, at 68 (“No circuit or Board decision
has articulated application of the statutory standard in [the domestic violence]
setting.”); Matter of L.R., CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, supra
note 8 (explaining that the BIA decision in L.R. is not binding on courts but
only on asylum officers).
75. See, e.g., Paul Elias, Domestic Violence Victim Granted Asylum in US,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 18, 2009, available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/
photos%20%20Domestic%20Violence%20Victim%20Granted%20Asylum%20In%
20US%20_%20NPR.pdf; Preston, supra note 7, at A14.
76. Musalo & Knight, supra note 49, at 1 (conducting a survey of forty-five
unpublished decisions of immigration judges showing many cases where asylum was granted).
77. Musalo, supra note 50, at 777–78 (noting that unlike in the United
Kingdom, the jurisprudence in the United States has been contradictory); cf.
Bridgette A. Carr, Incorporating a “Best Interests of the Child” Approach into
Immigration Law and Procedure, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 120, 145
n.133 (2009) (noting that there have been more successful gender-based claims
in Canada than the United States).
78. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006) (defining refugee status); Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (Can.) (same); see also
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 18, at 150.
79. 18 U.S.C. § 3561 (2006).
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intimate partner, because this is the most prevalent type of
domestic violence.80 Although same-sex and female-on-male
domestic abuse occurs, these applicants face additional challenges in seeking asylum requiring more in-depth discussion
than can be provided here.81
The key U.S. domestic abuse asylum case, In re R-A-, involved a Guatemalan woman seeking asylum after suffering
ten years of severe and repeated abuse by her husband before
she finally fled the country.82 In that decision, Attorney General Reno vacated the BIA’s denial of asylum.83 She remanded
and stayed the case for reconsideration after the approval of a
proposed set of federal rules to be issued by the INS.84 The
agency never issued the rules, and In re R-A- continued under
the stay for seven years until Attorney General Mukasey ordered the case remanded to the BIA for decision.85 Due to the
stay and failure to enact the proposed federal rules, a backlog
of cases involving gender-based social groups developed, and
the Attorney General remanded the case in an attempt to force
the BIA to solidify the law in domestic violence asylum
claims.86 The BIA remanded to the immigration judge, and on
October 28, 2009, DHS argued that the applicant qualified for
asylum under the statute.87 An immigration judge granted asy80. See SHANNAN CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES (2007),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipvus.pdf.
81. See Nicole LaViolette, Gender-Related Refugee Claims: Expanding the
Scope of the Canadian Guidelines, 19 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 169, 204 (2007) (discussing the difficulties men experience when claiming asylum based on domestic violence under the Canadian Guidelines); Fatma E. Marouf, The
Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining a “Particular Social
Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 86 (2008) (describing some of
the challenges faced by lesbians seeking asylum based on the lack of social visibility of sexual orientation in many cultures).
82. R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 908–09 (B.I.A. 2001).
83. Id. at 906.
84. Id. The proposed rule would have provided guidance for gender-based
claims, including incorporating language from the UNHCR handbook regarding the court’s determination of when a government is unable or unwilling to
protect a victim. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588,
76,591 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208). The court
would have to consider “whether the government takes reasonable steps to
control the infliction of harm or suffering and whether the applicant has reasonable access to the state protection that exists.” Id.
85. R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629, 630–32 (A.G. 2008).
86. Id. at 630.
87. DHS Response in Alvarado-Pena, supra note 16.
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lum on December 16, 2009, ending the most publicized domestic violence asylum case favorably for the applicant and potentially paving the way for others.88 The focus in U.S. domestic
violence asylum cases up to this point has been on the applicant’s particular social group.
In other countries, courts move beyond discussion of a domestic violence applicant’s particular social group to examine
the government’s role in the alleged persecution. Some foreign
courts have used a “bifurcated approach,” where the legal
theory acknowledges that an applicant’s persecutor is an individual not abusing her based on her particular social group, but
rather that the government fails to protect her based on a
gender-defined social group.89 Great Britain’s House of Lords
introduced this approach in Ex parte Shah where the court
granted asylum to Pakistani victims of domestic violence.90 The
Lords found the appropriate test to be “Persecution = Serious
Harm + The Failure of State Protection,” where the state’s failure to protect could serve as the nexus to the particular social
group rather than the individual abuser.91 This approach resulted in successful claims in other foreign courts as well.92 In
the United States, however, the BIA rejected the use of a bifurcated approach in the appeal of In re R-A-, and instead emphasized that the nexus must be between the actual persecutor and
the particular social group.93 Although the Attorney General
vacated the earlier decision in In re R-A-, no U.S. court has explicitly adopted the bifurcated approach.94
88. Elias, supra note 75; Julia Preston, Officials Endorse Asylum for
Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2009, at A14, available at 2009 WLNR 21654842.
89. Musalo, supra note 50, at 788.
90. Ex Parte Shah, [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (H.L.) [647] (appeal taken from Immigration Appeal Tribunal) (Eng.).
91. Id. at 653.
92. See, e.g., Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Khawar
[2002] HCA 14, ¶ 33 (Austl.) (demonstrating how an Australian court used a
bifurcated analysis to find asylum appropriate for a Pakistani domestic violence victim); REFUGEE STATUS APPEALS AUTHORITY: NEW ZEALAND, REFUGEE
APPEAL NO. 76512 (2000), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/
4c3adf5b2.pdf (adopting the House of Lords test from Ex parte Shah to grant
asylum to a victim of domestic violence from Iran).
93. R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 922 (B.I.A. 2001) (“But governmental inaction is not a reliable indicator of the motivations behind the actions of private
parties. And this is not a case in which it has been shown that the Government
of Guatemala encourages its male citizens to abuse its female citizens . . . .”).
94. See Lori A. Nessel, “Willful Blindness” to Gender-Based Violence
Abroad: United States’ Implementation of Article Three of the United Nations
Convention Against Torture, 89 MINN. L. REV. 71, 108–11 (2004); cf. Karen
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In the United Kingdom, Ex parte Shah remains the controlling case on domestic violence asylum.95 Subsequent cases
followed the Ex parte Shah model, holding that “domestic violence, if coupled with a lack of state protection that is discriminatory, is capable of constituting persecution.”96 Since Ex parte
Shah, many cases on appeal have centered on relocation in the
applicant’s home country.97 Analysis of relocation to a safer
part of the applicant’s home country necessarily considers the
government’s ability to better protect the applicant in a different part of the country.98 The bifurcated analysis in Ex parte
Shah makes the applicant’s burden of proving persecution on
account of a particular social group fairly clear, thereby leaving
difficult fact-specific questions surrounding the reasonableness
of relocation.99 In British courts, the test for relocation is
whether relocation would be unreasonable and unduly harsh.100
In determining reasonableness, courts consider several factors
from the Home Office in the context of human rights claims, including the position of women in society, the education and lit-

Musalo, Claims for Protection Based on Religion or Belief, 16 INT’L J. REFUGEE
L. 165, 208 (2004) (stating, in relation to an asylum claim on religious
grounds, that the bifurcated test has fared poorly in the United States).
95. See Shah, [1999] 2 A.C. at 653.
96. P v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1640,
[31] (Eng.).
97. See, e.g., AB (Jamaica) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2008]
EWCA (Civ) 784 (Eng.); CM (Cameroon) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t,
[2008] EWCA (Civ) 125 (Eng.); AA (Sudan) v. Sec’y of State for the Home
Dep’t, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 95 (Eng.); VNM v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t,
[2006] EWCA (Civ) 47 (Eng.).
98. See R (on the application of M) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t,
[2010] EWHC (Admin) 1560, [19] (Eng.) (considering the general conditions for
women in Pakistan in regard to reasonable relocation); see also AA (Sudan),
[2007] EWCA (Civ) at [13] (stating that based on the position of women in Pakistani society relocation is not reasonable); RG (Ethiopia) v. Sec’y of State for
the Home Dep’t, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 339, [41] (Eng.) (remanding for analysis
on whether relocation would be safe).
99. See, e.g., AB (Jamaica), [2008] EWCA (Civ) at [6]; VNM, [2006] EWCA
(Civ) at [15, 25] (considering whether expecting a domestic violence victim to
relocate within Kenya and live the remainder of her life under a false story
regarding her history and the paternity of her children was reasonable); R (on
the application of Umar) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2008] EWHC
(Admin) 2385, [4] (Eng.).
100. AB (Jamaica), [2008] EWCA (Civ) at [34]; Hamid v. Sec’y of State for
the Home Dep’t, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1219, [32] (Eng.) (affirming the “unduly
harsh” test for relocation in asylum claims).
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eracy of women, and the woman’s economic self-sufficiency.101
Thus, domestic violence asylum applicants in the United Kingdom still face evidentiary challenges centered on the government’s ability to protect the applicant and reasonable relocation despite the expansive social group language in Ex parte
Shah.
The seminal case in Canada on the government protection
element, Ward v. Canada, recognized gender as a basis for a
particular social group, but emphasized that asylum is a substitute for the protection of an applicant’s country of origin.102
The court found a presumption of state protection,103 which an
applicant must rebut with “relevant, reliable and convincing
evidence which satisfies the trier of fact on a balance of probabilities that the state protection is inadequate.”104 Courts selected “adequacy” over “effectiveness” as the test for state protection because “requiring effectiveness of other countries’
authorities would be to ask of them what our own country is
not always able to provide.”105 Case law indicates that although
100 percent effectiveness is not required, a state must demonstrate more than “good intentions” regarding protection of domestic violence victims.106 The Canadian appellate courts encouraged using multiple factors or pieces of evidence to make
decisions about a government’s ability and willingness to protect an applicant.107 Although gender can form the basis of a
particular social group in Canadian courts, asylum applicants
still face difficult obstacles in demonstrating inadequacy of
state protection.
United States asylum law surrounding domestic violence
victims may be moving closer to that of Canada and the United
Kingdom with statements by DHS in its supplemental brief in
101. See Hamid, [2005] EWCA (Civ) at [2] (distinguishing these factors as
relevant in human rights claims but not when considering relocation in asylum cases); cf. AA (Sudan), [2007] EWCA (Civ) at [13].
102. Ward v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, paras. 25, 78 (Can.).
103. Id. at para. 59.
104. Carrillo v. Canada, [2008] 4 F.C.R. 636, para. 30 (Can.).
105. Flores v. Canada, 2008 CarswellNat 1702, para. 11 (Can. F.C.) (WL).
106. Hooper v. Canada, 2007 CarswellNat 4578, para. 30 (Can. F.C. ) (WL);
see also Vidhani v. Canada, [1995] 3 F.C. 60, paras. 13–14 (Can.) (finding adequate government protection in Kenya where there are laws prohibiting domestic violence, advocacy groups are present, there are documented cases of
recourse for victims of domestic violence, and the applicant failed to seek assistance from the Kenyan government prior to applying for asylum relief ).
107. See, e.g., Hooper, 2007 CarswellNat 4578, paras. 19, 29; Mitchell v.
Canada, 2006 CarswellNat 262, paras. 9–10 (Can. F.C.) (WL).
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In re L.R.108 DHS stated that acceptable social groups for domestic violence applicants include “[nationality] women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” or “[nationality]
women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions
within a domestic relationship.”109 DHS recognized that removing the formation of the particular social group from the analysis still leaves significant hurdles for applicants, especially in
showing that a state is unable or unwilling to protect the applicant and in showing the reasonableness of relocation.110 Since
the positive decision for R-A-, courts have already begun to focus on the government’s role in the persecution. The Ninth Circuit has denied a Honduran domestic violence victim based on
her inability to prove the government was unable and unwilling
to protect her with no discussion of her social group.111 The remainder of this Note examines these other obstacles that will
most likely be the new focus of judicial analysis in domestic violence based asylum claims.
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ASYLUM TURNS ON A LACK
OF GOVERNMENT PROTECTION
Despite the focus in the past twenty years on fitting domestic violence asylum applicants into a particular social group
acceptable under U.S. asylum law, the element upon which asylum hinges for most applicants will become the lack of government protection. This element is likely to emerge in the forefront of the discussion on asylum now that DHS has made clear
that the Obama Administration considers domestic violence
grounds for asylum.112 This Part demonstrates that the government protection element, although less discussed, is the key
to asylum and illustrates the problems applicants encounter in
proving an “unable and unwilling government.” This Part also
evaluates the INS proposed rule considered in 2000, the Canadian Guidelines, and the U.K. Guidelines as potential models
for future DHS guidelines.
108. See Supplemental Brief in L.R., supra note 6, at 14.
109. Id. at 14.
110. Id. at 21–22.
111. Maldonado-Chinchilla v. Holder, 388 F. App’x 598, 598 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“Maldonado-Chinchilla did not establish the abuse she suffered constituted
persecution because she failed to show the government was unwilling or unable to protect her from her boyfriend.”).
112. See Supplemental Brief in L.R., supra note 6, at 11 (indicating that
DHS believes there are formulations of particular social groups that would
make asylum permissible for domestic violence victims).
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A. THE LURKING ELEMENT: AN UNABLE OR UNWILLING
GOVERNMENT
The United Kingdom and Canada created a path for domestic violence applicants under the particular social group
provisions in their statutes, but the result has not been a
marked increase in domestic violence asylees.113 This lack of increased asylum for domestic violence victims is due in part to
the heavy emphasis the British and Canadian courts place on
the governmental protection element. In cases where asylum
was denied or the case was remanded, the courts’ decisions now
often hinge on the governmental protection element.114 The
practical example of the courts of the United Kingdom and
Canada indicate that U.S. courts will also likely shift their emphasis to governmental protection now that DHS created room
in the particular social group for domestic violence victims.115
Even eliminating a requirement for persecution “on account of”
one of the five statutory grounds entirely will not assist a domestic violence asylum applicant in proving a lack of government protection.116 The requirement that an applicant prove
her government is unable or unwilling to offer protection from
domestic violence quells fears that DHS’s acceptance of gender
as grounds for a particular social group will open the floodgates

113. Helen P. Grant, The Floodgates Are Not Going to Open, but Will the
U.S. Border?, 29 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 53 (2006) (stating that other countries,
including the United Kingdom, created a path to asylum despite the fear of a
floodgates issue); Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution:
Fear of Floodgates or Call to (Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L.
119, 133 (2007) (noting that Canadian statistics do not indicate a significant
increase in gender-based asylum claims since the issuance of the Guidelines).
114. See, e.g., Carrillo v. Canada, [2008] 4 F.C.R. 636, para. 36 (Can.) (denying asylum where the applicant failed to establish inadequate state protection); Flores v. Canada, 2008 CarswellNat 1702, paras. 8–11 (Can. F.C.) (WL)
(upholding a lower court decision denying asylum where the applicants did not
demonstrate a lack of adequate government protection); AB (Jamaica) v. Sec’y
of State for the Home Dep’t, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 784, [34] (Eng.) (denying asylum where the applicant failed to show that the government could not offer her
protection anywhere in her country); AA (Sudan) v. Sec’y of State for the Home
Dep’t, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 95, [13] (Eng.) (remanding the case for the lower
court to consider the lack of governmental protection throughout the country).
115. Supplemental Brief in L.R., supra note 6, at 21–22.
116. See Crystal Doyle, Note, Isn’t “Persecution” Enough? Redefining the
Refugee Definition to Provide Greater Asylum Protection to Victims of GenderBased Persecution, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 519, 558 (2009)
(discussing two potential downsides to eliminating the five statutory grounds
for asylum).
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of asylum seekers.117 Indeed, applicants will continue to face
obstacles in proving inadequate government protection, because their persecutors are individual actors. In asylum cases
where U.S. courts accepted the proffered particular social
group, such as honor killings and HIV positive applicants, proving the government is the persecutor or is at least unwilling to
intervene has been the pivotal element.118 Although always
present and discussed in a cursory manner, the element of government protection is likely to become the key to most domestic
violence applicant’s claims in U.S. courts.
B. THE CHALLENGES OF PROVING AN UNABLE OR UNWILLING
GOVERNMENT
An applicant faces many difficulties in proving that her
government is unable or unwilling to protect her. Some of these
difficulties arise from balancing a victim’s attempts to receive
assistance with her hesitancy to take action, the private nature
of domestic abuse, and the relative lack of power of the abuser
as compared to the government. This section focuses on these
three significant obstacles.
Victims frequently hesitate in reporting violence due to
embarrassment and fears that the violence will increase if their
partner learns the victim reported the abuse.119 In countries
where the cultural perception reflects a lack of governmental
support to domestic violence victims, abused women are likely
to refrain from reporting the abuse, assuming a report would be
futile.120 Although courts recognize the potential obstacles to
117. See Musalo, supra note 113, at 133. But see The Abrams Report
(MSNBC television broadcast Mar. 11, 2004) (hosting Pat Buchanan, who argued that domestic violence asylum seekers can go to Canada and should be
kept out of the United States for fear of a floodgates problem).
118. Paredes v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 219 F. App’x 879, 884, 887 (11th Cir. 2007)
(upholding the BIA and Immigration judge decisions regarding the HIVpositive applicant’s failure to prove government involvement or support of his
persecution); Yaylacicegi v. Gonzales, 175 F. App’x 33, 36 (7th Cir. 2006) (denying asylum to a woman due to her failure to prove the government would
not protect her from an honor killing).
119. WORLD HEALTH ORG., MULTI-COUNTRY STUDY ON WOMEN’S HEALTH
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 75–77 (2005) [hereinafter WHO
STUDY], available at http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who_multicountry_
study/en/index.html.
120. Ex Parte Shah, [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (H.L.) [635–36] (appeal taken from
Immigration Appeal Tribunal) (Eng.) (stating that reporting domestic abuse in
Pakistan would be futile); WHO STUDY, supra note 119, at 87 (reporting frequent responses of “‘nobody will believe me’ or ‘they will not be able to help’” to
the question why not seek government services for domestic violence posed to
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victims in reporting, most courts prefer a domestic violence asylum applicant to have at least attempted to obtain state aid.121
Although there is no official requirement that an applicant attempt to utilize government assistance in her country of origin,122 she gains credibility in alleging unavailable government
protection if she attempted to receive services to no avail.
Domestic abuse, by its very name, occurs primarily in the
home.123 In most countries, the home is a private sphere where
governmental influence is muted.124 Due to this lack of government influence, the likelihood of the government discovering domestic violence is very low unless the victim reports it.125
Nongovernmental aid agencies confront difficulties in determining the scope of the domestic abuse problem in countries
where there is little reporting.126 This expectation of privacy in
the home exists in the United States, and it would be hypocritical for the United States to require governments of other countries to breach the privacy of their citizens to ensure protection
from domestic violence when the home is given special consideration in the United States.127 The United States combats the
problem of private domestic violence through public education,
the availability of victim support programs, and responsive law
24,000 women from various countries in a study, thus “highlight[ing] the credibility gap of many services”).
121. See, e.g., Lopez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir.
2007) (requiring an attempt to obtain state aide absent exceptional circumstances); Kere v. Gonzales, 252 F. App’x 708, 712 (6th Cir. 2007) (requiring the
asylum seeker to show the government either condoned or was helpless to prevent the persecution); Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir.
2005) (stating that government agents must either commit the persecution or
be unwilling or unable to prevent it); Roman v. INS, 233 F.3d 1027, 1034 (7th
Cir. 2000) (requiring that local government either condone or be unable to
prevent persecution of the victim).
122. S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1335 (B.I.A. 2000) (“Although she did not
request protection from the government, the evidence convinces us that even if
the respondent had turned to the government for help, Moroccan authorities
would have been unable or unwilling to control her father’s conduct.”); Asylum
and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,591 (Dec. 7, 2000) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
123. 18 U.S.C. § 3561(b) (2006) (defining domestic abuse as a violent crime
against spouses, children, or others who are likely to live in or frequently visit
the home of the abuser).
124. See Musalo & Knight, supra note 49, at 2.
125. See WHO STUDY, supra note 119, at vii (noting that a lack of reporting
makes it difficult to document “the magnitude of violence against women”).
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (finding a
constitutional right to privacy in the marital home).
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enforcement and courts.128 Even in the United States, however,
there are areas of the country where these support programs do
not function and women remain in abusive relationships.129
This implies that it is unrealistic to expect a foreign government to have a 100 percent success rate in protecting domestic
violence victims.130 In many countries the private nature of
domestic violence causes victims to feel embarrassment and
risk cultural ostracization by reporting the abuse.131 Thus, the
private nature of domestic violence crimes makes it difficult for
an applicant to demonstrate a pattern of failure by her native
country in responding to these crimes.132
Lastly, applicants face problems in overcoming the commonsense notion that the government, with overwhelming
power compared to an individual persecutor, should be able to
control that persecutor. A domestic violence applicant’s argument that the government is unable to control her persecutor is
much more challenging than that of an asylum applicant arguing a militant faction or influential cultural or social group is
uncontrolled by the government.133 Controlling a single individual in a country where any type of law enforcement exists

128. See Laura Dugan et al., Do Domestic Violence Services Save Lives?,
NIJ J., Nov. 2003, at 20, 21 (describing various domestic violence resources
available to victims in the United States).
129. See Sofia Peralta & Henry F. Fradella, Variations in Suggestions for
Improving the Justice Systems’ Response to Intimate Partner Violence Cases,
44 CRIM. L. BULL. 442, 448 (2008) (noting several of the psychological reasons
why victims of domestic violence remain in abusive relationships).
130. See Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,591
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208) (“[N]o government is
able to guarantee the safety of each of its citizens at all times.”).
131. See WHO STUDY, supra note 119, at 75–77; see also CAROL BOHMER &
AMY SHUMAN, REJECTING REFUGEES: POLITICAL ASYLUM IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 227 (2008) (discussing the “personal,” rather than “political,” nature
of domestic violence); DAVID HOLLENBACH, REFUGEE RIGHTS: ETHICS,
ADVOCACY, AND AFRICA 131 (2008) (stating that asylum adjudicators often
view gender-specific persecution as “personal” or “cultural”).
132. See WHO STUDY, supra note 119, at 75–77.
133. See, e.g., Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038, 1044 –46 (9th Cir. 1998)
(granting asylum where the Ukrainian government was not able to control ultra nationalists who persecuted Jews); Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1360 (9th
Cir. 1996) (granting asylum where the government could not control ethnicFijian attacks against Indo-Fijians); Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 362
(B.I.A. 1996) (finding the government of Togo made no efforts to prevent the
practice of FGM by tribal elder women); H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 345 (B.I.A.
1996) (recognizing that there was no effective government protection in Somalia amidst warring clans).
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seems a reasonable expectation.134 Significant crime or strife
would need to exist within a country to imagine a situation
where law enforcement resources were entirely consumed such
that a single individual could not be controlled.135 Country condition reports136 alone will usually be insufficient to demonstrate that a functioning government is incapable of controlling
an individual.137 An applicant will need to supplement general
country condition information with her own personal experience where it will be difficult to demonstrate law enforcement
inability if she has not reported her abuse.138
New DHS regulations should address these three challenges to domestic violence asylum applicants. The following
sections assess potential tests and factors for inclusion in a
standard for identifying an unable or unwilling government.
C. A RULE PROPOSED AND NEVER ADOPTED
The Department of Justice proposed a rule in 2000, but it
was never enacted.139 The proposed rule addressed the element
of government protection, suggesting a two-part inquiry to determine a government’s inability or unwillingness to protect its
citizens. First, a judge or asylum officer should look at whether
the government took “reasonable steps to control the infliction

134. See, e.g., Supplemental Brief in L.R., supra note 6, at 26 (stating that
the applicant will have a difficult time demonstrating there is no government
protection in Mexico where a functional police force and legal system exist
from which the applicant did receive assistance).
135. See H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 345 (discussing how widespread, intraclan
fighting placed many Somalis “beyond the rule and protection of recognized
law and social order”).
136. Courts rely on country-condition reports by the State Department,
humanitarian organizations, and other sources to corroborate or determine
whether an applicant is likely to suffer persecution in her home country. See,
e.g., Sugiarto v. Holder, 586 F.3d 90, 98 (1st Cir. 2009); Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I.
& N. Dec. at 362.
137. Susan K. Kerns, Note, Country Conditions Documentation in U.S. Asylum Cases: Leveling the Evidentiary Playing Field, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 197, 201 (2000) (“Evidence of generally oppressive conditions in the
country of origin is by itself insufficient to show that the individual applicant
is at particular risk on account of a protected characteristic or belief.”); Krishma C. Parsad, Note, Illegal Renditions and Improper Treatment: An Obligation to Provide Refugee Remedies Pursuant to the Convention Against Torture,
37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 681, 697 (2009) (noting that country-condition
information produced by the State Department may not be accurate).
138. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,593
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
139. See id. at 76,588 (noting that the rule still retains its “proposed” status).
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of harm or suffering.”140 Second, the court or asylum officer
must determine if “the applicant has reasonable access to the
state protection that exists.”141 The rule goes on to suggest evidence that may support these inquiries, including government
complicity toward the harm, attempts by the applicant to get
government assistance, the government’s response, obligatory
official action, a pattern of unresponsiveness, denial of services,
general country conditions, government policies regarding the
suffering, and prevention steps by the government.142 The proposed rule in its 2000 formulation does not provide the kind of
guidance or focus helpful to courts and practitioners.
The proposed rule does not go far enough because it fails to
clarify whether an applicant must show both that the government has not taken reasonable steps to control the abuse and
that she does not have reasonable access to protection. It is unclear if proof of just one of these elements would suffice to meet
the applicant’s burden as to a lack of government protection.
The comments to the rules indicate that an applicant’s failure
to seek governmental protection is not dispositive of a state’s
inability or unwillingness to protect the applicant.143 This implies that the second prong of the test is more complex than
merely showing an applicant did not report her abuse to the police and should therefore be denied asylum. This lack of clarity
and focus results in an only moderately helpful framework, and
since the proposed rule was never adopted, litigants and courts
continue with insufficient guidance.
D. CANADIAN AND U.K GUIDELINES
Other countries address the problem of domestic violence
asylum seekers by issuing guidelines for their immigration
courts and applicants.144 Canada and the United Kingdom
serve as examples of approaches by other countries with asylum statutes similar to those of the United States.145 Although
both Canada and the United Kingdom are viewed as more welcoming to domestic violence asylum applicants than the United
140. Id. at 76,591.
141. Id.
142. Id. These evidentiary factors come primarily from case law where the
various factors were found persuasive or at least considered by a court hearing
a gender-based asylum claim. See id.
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 57; U.K. GUIDELINES, supra note 59.
145. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.

2011]

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ASYLUM

1889

States,146 they both maintain fairly rigid guidelines on the element of government protection leading to case decisions centered on governmental protection.147
The Canadian Guidelines allow for gender-based asylum
claims despite the lack of gender as a protected category in the
Canadian Immigration Act.148 They focus on the individual
woman’s situation and spend time addressing the evidentiary
problems associated with proving an unwilling or unable government.149 The guidelines require the applicant to prove it was
“objectively unreasonable for her to seek the protection of her
state.”150 In order to determine objective reasonableness, a
court should consider social, cultural, religious, and economic
factors influencing the applicant’s environment.151 The guidelines even suggest that being ostracized from one’s community
due to reporting domestic violence may be a sufficient factor to
show it is unreasonable for the applicant to seek government
protection.152 They also recognize the scarcity of evidence of
gender-related persecution, and, therefore, state that testimony
of the applicant or women in similar situations may be all a
court has to consider in making a decision.153
On their face, the Canadian Guidelines appear to be more
deferential to the individual than the proposed U.S. rule. The
146. See M. Beth Morales Singh, Note, To Rescue, Not Return: An International Human Rights Approach to Protecting Child Economic Migrants Seeking Refuge in the United States, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 511, 537–
38 (2008) (discussing how courts in Canada and the United Kingdom, among
other countries, have “linked refugee law to international human rights law,”
but how U.S. courts lag behind in this respect).
147. See Flores v. Canada, 2008 CarswellNat 1702, para. 11 (Can. F.C.)
(WL); Hooper v. Canada, 2007 CarswellNat 4578, para. 30 (Can. F.C.) (WL);
AB (Jamaica) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 784
(Eng.); CM (Cameroon) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2008] EWCA
(Civ) 125 (Eng.); AA (Sudan) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007]
EWCA (Civ) 95 (Eng.).
148. CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 57, pmbl. (“The definition of Convention refugee in the Immigration Act does not include gender as an independent enumerated ground for a well-founded fear of persecution warranting
the recognition of Convention refugee status. . . . [I]t has been more widely
recognized that gender-related persecution is a form of persecution which can
and should be assessed by the Refugee Division panel hearing the claim.”).
149. See id. at C(2).
150. Id. The Guidelines explicitly differentiate between state protection
and protection from a nongovernmental organization. Id. The Guidelines deem
the availability of the latter to be irrelevant. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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standard of proof for the applicant in Canada, however, is clear
and convincing evidence,154 and in practice, this has been a
fairly difficult obstacle for applicants to overcome. For example,
an applicant failed to meet her burden of proof that the government’s protection was inadequate where she only reported
abuse to the police one time in four years and did not utilize
any of the state human rights programs or seek legal recourse.155 In another case, the court held that the applicant
provided sufficient evidence of the inadequacy of state protection where an applicant reported her abuse to the police after
two brutal beatings, her husband was released from arrest after only an hour detention, neighbors and friends also reported
the abuse to the police with no subsequent law enforcement action, and official reports on poor police response in the country
existed.156 The premier Canadian case on persecution by nonstate actors stated that, other than states that are in complete
breakdown, a state is presumed capable of protecting its citizens.157 Thus, an applicant to Canada must overcome a fairly
significant burden in order to demonstrate her country cannot
offer protection.
In the United Kingdom, the 2000 Asylum Gender Guidelines support a “practical standard” that examines actual practices and states that the protection must be “meaningful, accessible, effective, and available to a woman regardless of her
culture and position.”158 The United Kingdom offers a nonexhaustive list of possible ways a government could fail to provide
protection: official legislation; legal provisions or lack of legal
provisions; access to justice and police protection; police response; reluctance or refusal to investigate, prosecute, or punish persecutors; and encouragement or toleration of social, religious, or customary practices and behavioral norms.159 These
guidelines match the court’s reasoning in the Ex parte Shah
case, where the House of Lords explained that the domestic violence suffered by the applicant in Pakistan would not be per154. Id.
155. Carrillo v. Canada, [2008] 4 F.C.R. 636, para. 30 (Can.). Additionally,
the court stated that the burden of showing inadequate state protection will be
harder to meet where the country from which an applicant is seeking asylum
is a democracy. Id. para. 32.
156. Hooper v. Canada, 2007 CarswellNat 4578, paras. 2–5, 20, 32 (Can.
F.C.) (WL).
157. Ward v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, para. 57 (Can.).
158. U.K. GUIDELINES, supra note 59, at 2B.2–.3.
159. Id. at 2B.
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secution if it occurred in the United Kingdom,160 because in the
United Kingdom, state protection is available to the victim, the
persecutor could be prosecuted, and the victim could obtain a
restraining order.161 The analysis in the Ex parte Shah case focused on the individual applicant’s access to services rather
than the government’s purported program.162
Both the Canadian Guidelines and the U.K. Guidelines focus on the applicant’s access to government protection.163 This
is seen as the factor that differentiates a country that is unable
or unwilling to protect domestic violence victims from, for example, the United States, Canada, or the United Kingdom,
where some women will be victims of domestic violence, but the
abuse will not be considered persecution.164 In the case of domestic violence, focusing the analysis on the availability of government protection in relation to the individual applicant’s circumstances is wise. The persecutor in a domestic violence
situation is unique to the applicant; therefore, the applicant’s
ability to access government protection rather than the mere
existence of government systems should weigh more heavily in
the analysis. Emphasis on the individual applicant’s access is
further discussed in the following Part providing recommendations for DHS policy.
III. DHS SHOULD PROVIDE GUIDANCE ON THE
GOVERNMENTAL PROTECTION ELEMENT OF ASYLUM
Although scholars have not focused on the importance of
proving an unable and unwilling government,165 practitioners
and advocates should not ignore this element. As demonstrated
in Part II, courts focus on availability of government protection.
When the actual persecutor is an individual, proving an inability or unwillingness of the government to protect the domestic
violence victim is difficult. Practitioners would benefit from
160. Ex Parte Shah, [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (H.L.) [648] (appeal taken from Immigration Appeal Tribunal) (Eng.).
161. Id.
162. See id. at 653–54.
163. See Ward v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, paras. 56–59 (Can.) (finding
that state complicity is not a necessary component of persecution, and it must
be reasonable for the individual to seek state protection); Shah, [1999] 2 A.C.
at 648 (noting that “[w]hat makes it persecution” is the state being “unwilling
or unable to offer her any protection”).
164. See Shah, [1999] 2 A.C. at 648.
165. See Anker, supra note 61, at 778; Grant, supra note 113, at 53; Musalo, supra note 94, at 208; Musalo, supra note 50, at 781–82.
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guidance from DHS on this highly discretionary, fact-specific,
and until now neglected element of asylum. This Part recommends the test and factors DHS should encourage applicants to
focus on in meeting their burden of proof in this area.
A. THE TEST AND FACTORS TO APPLY TO DETERMINE AN
UNWILLING OR UNABLE GOVERNMENT
The Department of Justice and courts’ cursory treatment of
this element will likely come to an end with the acceptance of a
social group formulation for domestic violence victims. A test is
needed to ensure uniform analysis of this now important element. The single-prong test should be whether the domestic violence applicant has reasonable access to government protection. This simplifies the test suggested in the Department of
Justice’s 2000 proposed rule,166 and factors should accompany
this test to assist in its application. A combination of the proposed U.S. rule, the Canadian and U.K. Guidelines’ emphasis
on the individual applicant, and other factors found in Canadian and U.K. case law provide a helpful guide to immigration
judges, applicants, practitioners, and advocates.
Of the two-part analysis suggested in the Department of
Justice’s 2000 proposed rule,167 an ideal rule need only include
the second prong. The second part of the inquiry, asking
whether the particular applicant has reasonable access to state
protection, is the type of individualized inquiry that is essential
in domestic violence asylum cases.168 The first prong, inquiring
about the reasonable steps taken by the government to control
the harm,169 may be illustrative of the country’s general condition, but that should not suffice to determine availability of
government protection to a particular victim. The government’s
reasonable steps toward controlling the infliction of harm can
166. Cf. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588, 76,591
(proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208) (requiring a court to
assess both a state’s efforts to control the infliction of domestic violence and
also the individual applicant’s access to any such government protections).
167. Id.
168. See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 929–30 (B.I.A. 2001) (Guendelsberger,
Bd. Member, dissenting) (using the specific facts of R-A-’s situation to demonstrate the inadequacy of her accessibility to government protection); Hooper v.
Canada, 2007 CarswellNat 4578, paras. 29–30 (Can. F.C.) (WL) (finding that
even though a restraining order would have been available, it would have been
ineffective in the applicant’s circumstances); CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra
note 57, at C (“The central factor in such an assessment is, of course, the claimant’s particular circumstances . . . .”).
169. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,591.
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be included as a factor but should not be determinative. For example, a government could be taking steps to enforce domestic
violence laws and these efforts may be effective in urban areas.
An applicant from a rural area, with less police presence or corrupt police and a tight-knit community, still may not have reasonable access to government protection. An individual applicant’s reasonable access to government protection should be the
controlling question in this analysis.
In determining reasonable access to government protection, courts should weigh several factors noted in the proposed
rule, foreign guidelines, and case law. Drawing from all three
sources of law provides a more complete list of potential factors
for U.S. courts to consider. In order to assess the reasonableness of an applicant’s access to government protection, a court
should consider the following key factors: the government’s encouragement or toleration of social, religious, and customary
practices, and behavioral norms;170 attempts by the applicant
to get government assistance;171 police or government response
to reports of domestic violence;172 reluctance or refusal to investigate, prosecute, or punish persecutors;173 status or position of
the persecutor;174 general country conditions including the testimony of similarly situated women;175 social, cultural, religious, and economic factors influencing the applicant’s environment;176 the structure of the country’s legal system;177

170. U.K. GUIDELINES, supra note 59, at 2B.9.
171. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,591.
172. Id.; U.K. GUIDELINES, supra note 59, at 2B.8.
173. U.K. GUIDELINES, supra note 59, at 2B.8.
174. See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 909 (B.I.A. 2001) (using former military
service by the persecutor to convince the court that complaining to the police
would be futile); Carrillo v. Canada, [2008] 4 F.C.R. 636, para. 3 (Can.) (arguing that she could not escape her abuser because his brother was a federal
judicial police officer); AB v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2008] EWCA
(Civ) 784, [10] (Eng.) (finding the threat to the applicant was greater based on
her persecutor’s position as a gang leader in Jamaica); Declaration of L.R., supra note 1, at 4 (discussing persecutor’s position as a wealthy restaurant owner in the small Mexican village where applicant lived).
175. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,591;
CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 57, at C(2).
176. CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 57, at C(2). Social factors can include the size of the applicant’s community and the status of the persecutor in
that community. See Supplemental Brief in L.R., supra note 6, at 26 (stating
that issues dealing with an applicant’s “particular social group” remain germane to the asylum-granting inquiry).
177. U.K. GUIDELINES, supra note 59, at 2B.8.
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official government policies or legislation;178 and preventive actions taken by the government.179 Domestic violence applicants
have different circumstances and there could be additional factors relevant in particular cases.
Conversely, some other potential factors are irrelevant to
the inquiry into whether an applicant’s government is able to
provide adequate protection. For example, whether the victim
of domestic violence could have sought protection with her extended family has nothing to do with the government’s responsibility to offer reasonable protection.180 Parents who are capable of protecting their daughter from her abuser are valuable;
however, a capable and supportive family should not relieve the
government of its responsibility to protect victims of domestic
violence. Similarly, the existence of nongovernmental organizations dealing with issues of domestic violence in the applicant’s
country of origin does not excuse the government from accountability for protection of its citizens.181 Courts should only consider factors relating to the applicant’s relationship to her
state.
B. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED TEST TO THE CHALLENGES
OF ASYLUM APPLICANTS
The proposed test, with its focus on the individual applicant’s relationship to her government, eliminates some of the
evidentiary challenges a domestic violence asylum seeker faces.
The three significant obstacles to demonstrating eligibility for
asylum—the victim’s hesitancy to report, the private nature of
domestic violence, and the government’s overwhelming power
when compared to an individual persecutor—are all remedied
by the proposed test and the suggested accompanying factors.182
The proposed test accounts for a victim’s hesitancy to seek
assistance. Since the burden of proof in asylum cases lies with
the applicant,183 the above-suggested factors rely on demon178. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,591; U.K.
GUIDELINES, supra note 59, at 2B.8.
179. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,591.
180. But see id. (noting that the presence or absence of family support may
factor into the determination of whether an applicant has adequate access to
government protections).
181. CANADIAN GUIDELINES, supra note 57, at C(2).
182. See supra notes 119–38 and accompanying text.
183. Establishing Asylum Eligibility, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2010).
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strating her own actions will be easier to prove than the factors
that require explaining action or inaction on the part of the
government or her abuser. For example, an applicant can credibly testify to the fact that she called the police and they did not
respond. Her testimony, however, carries less weight when she
claims the government does not respond to domestic violence
claims generally, so she never attempted to receive assistance
personally. The weighing of many factors in the suggested test
dilutes the necessity for a domestic violence victim to report her
abuse to the police. A failed attempt to receive government assistance should not be a required element of an applicant’s
claim.184 Case law suggests, however, that this is a very persuasive piece of evidence.185 The applicant’s burden becomes
more challenging when the state was never given an opportunity to fail in its response to the harm.186 A court’s inclusion of
the following factors in its analysis will help to combat the perception that a victim hesitant to report does not deserve asylum: the government’s encouragement or toleration of social,
religious, and customary practices and behavioral norms; the
social, cultural, religious, and economic factors influencing the
applicant’s environment; the position and status of the persecutor; and the effectiveness of a government’s preventative steps
to curb domestic violence.187
Given that domestic violence is generally a private form of
persecution, a test focused on the individual victim’s experiences is logical. The applicant’s credible testimony may pro-

184. See Ex Parte Shah, [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (H.L.) [648] (appeal taken from
Immigration Appeal Tribunal) (Eng.); Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65
Fed. Reg. at 76,591; see generally Sharon Donovan, Note, No Where to Run
. . . No Where to Hide: Battered Women Seeking Asylum in the United States
Find Protection Hard to Come By: Matter of R-A-, 11 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J.
301, 333 (2001) (stating that women in the United States only report half of
the violent “incidents inflicted by their intimate partners to the police”).
185. See, e.g., Flores v. Canada, 2008 CarswellNat 1702, para. 5 (Can. F.C.)
(WL) (holding that the applicant failed to make diligent efforts to seek government protection); Espinosa v. Canada, 2005 CarswellNat 5991, para. 5
(Can. F.C.) (WL) (holding that the applicant did not meet her burden of proving the government’s inability to protect her, as she never complained of the
abuse); AA (Sudan) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] EWCA (Civ)
95, [4] (Eng.) (placing weight on the fact that the applicant sought police protection to no avail).
186. See Supplemental Brief in L.R., supra note 6, at 26–27 (placing emphasis on the fact that, when given the opportunity, a judge did assist L.R.
through a custody order in her favor).
187. See supra notes 170, 174, 176, 179 and accompanying text.
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vide the only evidence in some cases.188 Of the factors suggested to accompany the proposed test, the following factors
recognize the private nature of domestic violence: social, cultural, religious, and economic factors influencing the applicant’s environment; and the structure of the country’s legal system.189 By examining the applicant’s environment an asylum
officer or court can gain an understanding of the severity of the
persecution and the potential difficulties the applicant may face
in reporting or gaining access to the legal system.
The government, in most cases, wields significant power
compared to an individual abuser. Unfortunately, this does not
mean that the government is capable of protecting the individual applicant from her persecutor.190 A domestic violence applicant will most likely need to argue that the government is unwilling, for cultural or other reasons, to protect her, and the
individualized reasonable access approach addresses this problem directly. Country condition information from the state department or nongovernmental organizations working in the region may provide some evidence that a government is unwilling
to address the particular harm, but courts should consider the
applicant’s individual situation and not rely solely on general
country information in their assessment of this element.191 Factors that consider attempts by the applicant to get government
assistance; police or government response; reluctance or refusal
to investigate, prosecute, or punish persecutors; status or position of the persecutor; country conditions; and official government policies all address this power disparity between the government and the applicant’s persecutor.192 Looking at this wide
array of factors gives asylum officers and courts a sense of the
government’s actual relationship with the persecutor beyond
the inference that the sheer size and resources of a government
should afford it the ability to control an individual persecutor.
188. Establishing Asylum Eligibility, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (“The testimony
of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof
without corroboration.”).
189. See supra notes 176–77and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 909 (B.I.A. 2001) (explaining that,
although R-A- reported to police on multiple occasions, she never received protection because the police failed to follow through on a summons for her
husband).
191. See id. at 910–11 (examining the poor record of the Guatemalan government regarding spousal-abuse response); Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec.
357, 362 (B.I.A. 1996) (relying on State Department reports to demonstrate
Togo’s tolerance for FGM).
192. See supra notes 160–62, 175, 178 and accompanying text.
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If DHS had not stipulated to asylum in In re L.R., the suggested test and factors could have been applied to assist in assessing L.R.’s individual circumstances. As an illustration of
the application of the proposed test and factors to an actual
case, the following is a brief discussion of L.R.’s access to government protection; The Mexican government in rural areas
has a history of tolerating domestic violence and there is a general societal acceptance of the practice.193 L.R. reported her
abuse to police more than once, resulting in inadequate law enforcement response and statements from officers that it was a
private matter.194 This reluctance to investigate or prosecute
L.R.’s abuser was partially due to his status as a wealthy
member of their village.195 She did receive assistance through
the legal system on her third to attempt gain custody of her
children based on child abuse and received a protective order
against her abuser, but he was not punished for assaulting and
threatening her.196 L.R. was a licensed teacher with the potential to financially support herself, but she was economically
controlled by her husband.197 These factors may indicate that
even if the Mexican government as a whole does not tolerate
domestic abuse, L.R.’s personal experience in her town depicts
a government unwilling to protect her. A focus on the reasonableness of L.R. obtaining government protection in her individual situation through examination of the suggested factors allows evidence particular to the applicant’s situation rather
than general country condition information to control the outcome.
Approaching the element of government protection with a
focus on the individual applicant’s ability to access protection
allows for consideration of factors specific to that applicant.
This approach helps to alleviate the significant obstacles in the
path of asylum for domestic violence victims.

193. See Supplemental Brief in L.R., supra note 6, at 15 (noting that “social
expectations in Mexico do little to disabuse” men of the view that they have a
right to abuse their female partners); Declaration of L.R., supra note 1, at 9
(describing how people in L.R.’s village did nothing to help her when she was
beaten in public).
194. Declaration of L.R., supra note 1, at 9.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 14 –17.
197. Id. at 8, 11, 21.
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CONCLUSION
DHS’s statements in In re L.R. removed the issue of fitting
domestic violence asylum applicants into a “particular social
group,” which has been the focus of discussion in this area of
asylum law for the past twenty years. Courts, practitioners,
and advocates must now focus on another central element in
domestic violence asylum cases—proving a government unable
or unwilling to protect the applicant. DHS can aid this shift in
focus by including in new rules or guidance a framework for
analyzing this element. The department should adopt a test inquiring as to the applicant’s reasonable access to government
protection by emphasizing the ten factors discussed above. Encouraging an applicant-centered approach to the element of
governmental protection is reasonable where an applicant has
the opportunity to obtain and present a variety of evidence.
Any forthcoming rules from DHS should focus on the governmental protection element of asylum as it relates to domestic
violence applicants.

